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ABSTRACT Internet of Things (IoT) connects sensing devices to the Internet for the purpose of exchanging
information. Location information is one of the most crucial pieces of information required to achieve
intelligent and context-aware IoT systems. Recently, positioning and localization functions have been
realized in a large amount of IoT systems. However, security and privacy threats related to positioning in IoT
have not been sufficiently addressed so far. In this paper, we survey solutions for improving the robustness,
security, and privacy of location-based services in IoT systems. First, we provide an in-depth evaluation of
the threats and solutions related to both global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and non-GNSS-based
solutions. Second, we describe certain cryptographic solutions for security and privacy of positioning and
location-based services in IoT. Finally, we discuss the state-of-the-art of policy regulations regarding security
of positioning solutions and legal instruments to location data privacy in detail. This survey paper addresses
a broad range of security and privacy aspects in IoT-based positioning and localization from both technical
and legal points of view and aims to give insight and recommendations for future IoT systems providing
more robust, secure, and privacy-preserving location-based services.
INDEX TERMS Positioning, wireless localization, navigation, Internet of Things, GNSS, vulnerabilities,
security, privacy, cryptography, trustworthiness, literature study.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT), which is the concept of perva-
sive interconnected smart objects operating together to reach
common goals [1], has become particularly popular with
the rapid development of small low-cost sensors, wireless
communication technologies, and new Internet techniques.
Typical applications of IoT techniques includes intelligent
transportation and logistics, smart home/building, environ-
mental monitoring, medical and heath care, etc. Extensive
surveys of architectural elements, features and development
tendencies in IoT are provided in [1] and [2]. Key applications
and, in particular, applications of IoT in industry are reviewed
in [3] and [4]. Security has often had a low priority for vendors
of IoT devices and this has led to a situation where IoT is
filled with security vulnerabilities in practice. Hence, also
the security and privacy of location information and an IoT
enabled Location-Based Service (LBS) are often exposed to
attacks.
In IoT systems, context-awareness has been recognized as
a significant property. Within all the context sensing infor-
mation, the location information plays important roles [5].
During the last two decades, researchers and engineers
have developed a significant amount of prototypes, sys-
tems, and solutions using positioning and localization mod-
ules in IoT sensor nodes. For instance, Telit [6] integrates
the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) module
with Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) and Blue-
tooth Low Energy (BLE) receivers, and other localization
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enabled IoT systems include Sierra Wireless [7], SOFIA [8],
CRYSTAL [9], Carriots [10], Thingworx [11], etc.
FIGURE 1. Block diagram of the main actors in IoT positioning.
The main actors involved in IoT positioning are illustrated
in Fig. 1:
• The IoT device. The device whose location is determined
or used by the system. It can be smart or dumb; smart
IoT devices can have a positioning engine on themselves
and can support device-centric passive positioning
(i.e., without sending their location to the network);
dumb IoT devices can be positioned only in a network-
centric active approach (i.e., the network computes the
device location and it either sends it back to the device
or uses it for various location-based or location-aware
services).
• The network part. The part of the network that is
involved in positioning and LBS. It can be further split
into two either collocated or distinct parts:
– The Location Aggregator (LA). This is the network
part providing the location information (in network-
centric approaches) or the location databases
(in device-centric approaches).
– The Service Provider (SP). This is the network
part providing the location-aware or LBS to the
end-user/IoT device.
Various positioning technologies can be used in IoT. They
can be classified into three main classes, which are affected
by different security and privacy threats:
• GNSS positioning. This is one of the most privacy-
preserving solutions from the end-user’s point of view
because positioning is done directly in the IoT device
without the network or third parties. It works only for
smart IoT devices with incorporated GNSS receivers
and requires good signal propagation conditions,
e.g., outdoor conditions.
• Assisted-GNSS and Cloud-GNSS positioning. The
Assisted-GNSS transmits the assistance data (e.g. the
orbital parameters of the GNSS satellites, etc.) though a
wireless network, mostly commonly over a cellular data
channel [12]. As a result, the Assisted-GNSS signifi-
cantly improves the startup performance, i.e., time-to-
first-fix (TTFF) of a GNSS receiver. The Cloud-GNSS
receivers take advantage of cloud computing platforms
in computationally demanding applications, such as
indoor positioning and multi-constellation processing,
etc., or scientific applications which require collecting
and processing GNSS signals over different geographi-
cal locations [13].
• Non-GNSS positioning. This is a wide class of posi-
tioning systems without GNSS that encompasses every-
thing from cellular signals to Ultra Wide band (UWB),
WLAN, BLE, or Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
signals. Also the signals based on IoT standards, such as
enhanced Machine Type Communication (eMTC) [14],
[15], NarrowBand IoT (NB-IoT) [16], [17] and
LoRar [18] belong to this class.
In all interactions between the IoT positioning actors illus-
trated in Fig. 1, there are several sources of vulnerabilities in
terms of the robustness, security and privacy of the location
solution. The main ones are as follows:
• Intentional and unintentional system failures. These can
affect all actors in Fig. 1.
• Intentional and unintentional Radio Frequency inter-
ferences (RFI). These can affect all actors in Fig. 1,
although some interference types may be specific to a
certain technology, such as spoofing and jamming in
GNSS or interference in ISM (Industrial, Scientific and
Medical) bands for systems operating in the ISM bands,
e.g., WLAN and BLE.
• Database-related vulnerabilities. These typically affect
the LA and the IoT device in certain non-GNSS and
Cloud-GNSS solutions.
• Loopholes in privacy-related protection. These affect
mostly the SP.
The rest of the paper explains in more details these vul-
nerabilities and mitigation methods to deal with them. The
paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses robust-
ness of GNSS-based solutions for localization. These include
robustness against system level and service level faults,
robustness against unintentional interference due to atmo-
spheric conditions and RF transmissions in other frequency
bands, robustness against interference due to obstructions,
and lastly, security against intentional interference perpe-
trated through signal jamming and spoofing. Section III
addresses security of non-GNSS solutions. This includes dis-
cussion about database outlier detectors and malicious nodes
detectors, impact of malicious nodes on positioning perfor-
mance, and interference mitigation in non-GNSS positioning.
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Section IV describes cryptographic solutions for security and
privacy of positioning and LBS. This includes cryptographic
techniques for security of location information, secure local-
ization and location verification, IoT-related challenges for
implementing cryptography, and discussion about cryptogra-
phy for privacy-preserving LBSs. Section V discusses legal
dimensions of location data, with a focus on data protection
law. In addition, intentional interference of GNSS signals,
including jamming and spoofing, is discussed with a view
on the legal challenges it presents. Legal issues are dis-
cussed on a supra-national level, that is, in the framework
of the European Union (EU). This section does not discuss
other jurisdictions since the focus of legal research is on EU
law. The findings and recommendations from these sections
is summarized in Section VI with a discussion about the
technical and legal requirements for trusted navigation and
positioning solutions. We end the paper with conclusions in
Section VII.
FIGURE 2. Block diagram of GNSS threats to IoT positioning.
II. ROBUSTNESS AND SECURITY OF GNSS-BASED
SOLUTIONS FOR LOCALIZATION IN IoT
The possible GNSS threats to IoT positioning are shown
in Fig. 2. The solutions to improve the robustness and security
of theGNSS based positioning for IoTwill be discussed in the
following four part, i.e. robustness against GNSS system level
failures, robustness against effects of Earth’s atmosphere and
space weather, security against RF interference and robust-
ness with signal obstructions and indoors.
A. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST GNSS SYSTEM LEVEL FAULTS
A number of incidents have shown the possibility of
faults on the GNSS system level. Single GPS satellite
faults have occurred several times in the past includ-
ing failures of the satellite clock [19], [20], and signal
deformations caused by failures in the transmission hard-
ware [21]. In terms of multiple satellite faults, a failure
in the GNSS control segment can cause problems that
affect multiple satellites simultaneously. The GLONASS
system experienced such a fault in April 2014, when
incorrect satellite positions were transmitted by the entire
constellation for up to 10 hours [22]. Moreover, some
GPS-GLONASS dual-constellation receivers failed to
exclude the erroneous GLONASS measurements and make
a transition to stand-alone GPS positioning [23]. Another
control segment mishap affected GPS in January 2016,
when an anomaly in the time signal caused disruptions in
GPS-based timing systems worldwide [24].
Solutions to the threat of single satellite faults have been
addressed in the civil aviation domain, where integrity and
continuity are critical. It should be noted that methods which
have been developed for critical civilian applications, are also
feasible for IoT applications. The corresponding mitigation
methods are summarized in Table 1.
B. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST EFFECTS OF EARTH’S
ATMOSPHERE AND SPACE WEATHER
The GNSS signals travel more than 19000 km from the satel-
lite to receiver on the Earth. The different factors affecting
GNSS signals during the travel are well documented.
• Solar flares [30] and coronal mass ejections (CME)
result in electromagnetic energy [31] reaching the
Earth’s outer atmosphere [32], [33], which increases
the thickness and free electron content of the
Ionosphere [32], [34], [35].
• While passing through the Ionosphere, GNSS signals
experience refraction and diffraction effects, effectively
degrading the signal to noise ratio and phase cohesion,
and introducing a spatially variable delay component.
This is called ionospheric scintillation (IS).
• The Troposphere, and specially its contents of pollu-
tants and aerosols coupled with varying temperature and
humidity [35] also contribute to degradation in GNSS
signal quality, and introduces its own spatially variable
delay.
Together these layers of the atmosphere affect different
satellite signals differently because of the spatial diversity of
their penetration. The effect of the atmosphere on the GNSS
receivers [36]–[38] can thus be profound – introducing delay
errors [39] and hence degradations of tens of meters [40]
in positioning accuracy. High precision receivers using car-
rier phase-based positioning are especially vulnerable to
cycle slips, loss of tracking lock, and even complete outage
(unavailability of positioning, navigation and timing (PNT)
solution) for tens of seconds [33], [41], [42].
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TABLE 1. Solutions to improve robustness in system and service level for GNSS security positioning.
A number of solutions have been recommended over the
years to improve positioning robustness against atmospheric
and space weather effects and they are listed in Table 2.
C. SECURITY POSITIONING AGAINST RFI
RFI is a disturbance generated by an external source that
affects the signals in the radio frequency spectrum of the
interest [45]. In consideration of RFI to GNSS signals,
the interference sources can be classified as intentional
(e.g. jamming, meaconing and spoofing) and uninten-
tional [45], [46]. For the unintentional RFI, the sources are
mainly from the following aspects [46]–[48]:
• Energy leakage of out-of-band signals. For example, the
harmonic interference from audio and video wireless
broadcasting system, which occupy the FM, Ultra-High
Frequency (UHF) and Very High Frequency (VHF)
frequency spectrum, the narrow band signals gener-
ated by VHF Omnidirectional Radio-range (VOR) and
Instrument Landing System (ILS) for approach landing
systems, VHF communication system for Air Traffic
Control (ATC) communications and amateur radio
• Interference due to band’s approximate, e.g.
wideband inference to GPS and Galileo signals from
SATCOM band, which occupies the spectrum from
1626.5-1660MHz.
• In-band interference, which mainly caused by the pulse
signal from distance measurement equipment (DME)
and tactical air navigation system (TACAN), or wind
profile radars, of which the frequency spectrum ranges
from 962-1213 MHz, constituting a potential threat to
GNSS signals of Galileo E5 and GPS L5 band.
Intentional RFI, which is deliberate interference to GNSS,
includes mainly jamming and spoofing. Jamming is the trans-
mission of signals in the GNSS frequency bands with the
intent of disrupting the system operation, whereas spoofing
is the transmission of counterfeit GNSS-like signals with the
intent of fooling the receiver to use false information for
positioning calculations.
The effects of (un)intensional RFI on GNSS receiver are
assessed and analyzed in [45], [46], [49]–[52], which includes
the impact on different stages and observables in the GNSS
receiver, including the frond-end, acquisition stage, tracking
stage and the estimation of signal-to-noise ratios.
The methods to suppress RFI, especially the intentional
RFI (e.g. jamming and spoofing) are needed to preserve the
accuracy and guarantee the integrity of the GNSS-based solu-
tion in IoT systems. These techniques can be divided into four
categories: techniques based on signal processing, antenna
configuration, sensor integration and system deployment.
A summary of the mitigation techniques is provided
in Table 3.
D. ROBUST LOCALIZATION IN SIGNAL
OBSTRUCTIONS AND INDOORS
GNSS positioning is degraded in urban areas and forests,
where buildings and foliage, respectively, obstruct the signal
propagation and cause multipath. Furthermore, conventional
GNSS positioning is unavailable indoors and inside tun-
nels. Therefore, research and development has been active
for decades for finding methods enabling the position com-
putation in these challenging GNSS environments. These
methods may be divided into four categories based on the
equipment used for position computation: High-sensitivity
GNSS (HGNSS) receivers, GNSS pseudolites, fusion of
GNSS receiver with other data, and use of non GNSS radio
signals for computing the position solution independent of
GNSS. An overview of the three first ones is given in Table 4.
Section III will discuss more on the fourth category.
III. SECURITY OF NON-GNSS SOLUTIONS
FOR LOCALIZATION
The main security and privacy-related threats in non-GNSS
positioning for IoT devices are summarized in Table 5.
Typically, a non-GNSS positioning solution is either based
on a two-stage approach (offline training database cre-
ation and on-line estimation with inputs from the train-
ing database) or based on a one-stage approach involving
some timing or angle estimates. The first category is mostly
encountered in the Received Signal Strength (RSS) solu-
tions. This approach is often called location fingerprinting.
Recent and good overviews of RSS-based localization can be
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TABLE 2. Solutions to improve robustness against Inference from Earth’s atmosphere and space weather.
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TABLE 3. Mitigation methods against RFI.
found, e.g., in [83]–[86]. The second category of one-stage
approaches typically relies on Time Of Arrival (TOA), Time
Difference of Arrival (TDOA), Angle of Arrival (AOA) or
Phase Difference of Arrival (PDOA) techniques, explained,
e.g., in [87]–[90].
The IoT positioningmethods relying on a training database
have to cope with the possibility of database corruption
and malicious nodes attacks (e.g., access points transmit-
ting random or fake information). All non-GNSS positioning
methods are vulnerable to various RF interferences, both
wideband and narrowband. The non-GNSS positioning
methods relying on signals in the ISM spectra are more
vulnerable to interferences than those relying on signals in
licensed bands. Also, all these non-GNSS methods have to
rely on the network side (on LA, on SP or on both), and thus
the issue of the trustworthiness of the network components is
also an important one to be addressed.
A. IoT NON-GNSS TECHNOLOGIES FOR POSITIONING
AND RELATED SECURITY THREATS
The main non-GNSS technologies for positioning are
illustrated in Table 6, together with their vulnerabilities.
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TABLE 4. Robust localization in signal obstructions and indoors.
TABLE 5. Security threats and mitigation methods in non-GNSS based localization.
WLAN or WLAN-based positioning is by far the most
widespread non-GNSS positioning technology in smart IoT
devices [86], [91]–[93]. Other signals of opportunity, such as
BLE [93]–[95], RFID [96], digital TV [97], [98] or UWB [99]
can also offer positioning solutions, especially indoors. Wire-
less Sensor Network (WSN) based positioning is also used in
a variety of sensor applications [100].
Several threats are related to the training database
in RSS-based localization. The database includes infor-
mation about the Access Nodes (AN), i.e., the static
nodes of the network. In its simplest version the infor-
mation is just the location of the AN and its unique
Media Access Control (MAC) address [101], [102]
while the more sophisticated versions include also infor-
mation about signal propagation environment, such as
coverage areas of ANs [103] or location dependent
information on the probability distribution of the RSS from
each of the MAC addresses [104], [105]. The later category
of databases is usually based on extensive data collection.
However, the database can also be generated automatically
from AN locations and taking into account the signal prop-
agation properties of the environment, e.g., floor and wall
attenuations obtained from path-loss models and map or floor
plan information [104], [106].
Both in the generation and in the maintenance phase of
the database, several unintentional events may generate errors
that affect the localization reliability. The locations of the AN
or RSS entries may be estimated poorly, and if the location
input requires user input, human errors can produce errors
to the database. In crowdsourcing-based database generation
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TABLE 6. Non-GNSS based localization technologies and their security threats.
or maintenance human errors are more probable than in
cases when the persons are trained to do the data collection.
In crowdsourcing, it is also possible that someone inten-
tionally provides wrong locations, if they are entered man-
ually as they often are at least indoors. Wrong RSS values
can enter into the database if it is generated automatically
and the map information includes errors. In data collection
the poor RSS values can enter into the database if data is
collected with a device that measures or reports the RSS
unusually inaccurately. Again, this happens more likely in
crowdsourcing where non-dedicated devices may participate.
Once generated, the database requires maintenance, as the
signal or propagation environment may change if ANs or
obstacles such as walls, furniture, or vegetation, are moved,
removed or added. In device-centric localization, possible
communication line errors may corrupt the database during
its transfer from the database server to the user.
Cellular-based positioning solutions, covering all digital
cellular standards from 2G to 4G and beyond, e.g., to the
proposed 5G, have been increasingly offering more accuracy
and more robustness for the positioning functionality. Most
of the cellular-based approaches work in a network-centric
mode, where the network, based on the measurements from
the IoT device, computes the device location. More recently,
standards specifically dedicated to IoT communications, such
as LoRa [107], NB-IoT [108], eMTC or other Low Power
Wide Area Network (LPWAN) standards [109], support
positioning of the nodes to a certain extent. For example,
in LoRA, the positioning is supported via proprietary chirp
spread spectrum with time stamping of packet arrivals, plus
a combination of TDOA, RSS, and Differential RSS (DRSS)
estimators. The target positioning error in LoRa is 3m, with a
coverage up to 5 km range urban and up to 15 km range sub-
urban. In NB-IoT and Narrowband Cellular IoT (NB-CIoT)
standards, only the basic positioning inherited from LTE/4G
is supported, such as Cell-ID and Positioning Reference
Signals (PRS)-based. In Machine-to-Machine/Machine Type
Communications (M2M/MTC) standards, collaborative posi-
tioning methods have been proposed [110], which may
introduce an additional layer with possible vulnerabilities,
the one of the inter-communication between the
IoT devices.
B. DATABASE OUTLIER DETECTORS
Outlier detection methods developed by statistics and signal
processing communities [111] can be used to find possible
problems in the training database. As the data in databases
with location dependent RSS information or coverage areas
include mutual dependences, the consistency of the database
can be analysed by using various outlier detection methods.
With simple database including only MAC addresses and
location information of the ANs, the consistency checks can
be done when RSSmeasurements are available by comparing
simultaneous measurements from multiple ANs and using
theoretical coverage or path loss models and the geometry
of the AN locations.
For localization based on databases with RSS information,
the authors of [112] propose an outlier detection method
that is based on non-iterative RANdom SAmple Consen-
sus (RANSAC) to detect ANs from which the measured
RSS is severely distorted. A crowdsensing-based manage-
ment scheme for the training database is proposed in [113]
where the coverage and the accuracy of the initial database are
enhanced by collaboratively collected user data. Localization
system for WSNs that localizes the nodes, uses outlier detec-
tion to monitor the quality of the RSS database, and updates
the RSS database is proposed in [114]. The authors of [115]
propose a localization scheme for RSS fingerprinting where
the user’s location and the ANs with erroneous measurements
are jointly estimated by an online algorithm. For detecting
outliers without the RSS information in the database, [116]
proposes a method where distance is estimated from RSS and
trilateration residuals and hypothesis testing is used.
C. IDENTIFICATION OF MALICIOUS AND FAKE NODES
Malicious and fake nodes in IoT positioning are those access
nodes intentionally sending corrupt or fake information to the
training database of the LA. Such corrupt information can be,
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e.g., the node position or it can affect the RSS values, if the
malicious node changes randomly its transmission power, or
even the node identity (e.g., if the access nodes are faking
or changing their IP address, etc.). A malicious node trans-
mitting incorrect position is of particular threat in applica-
tions such as Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET) [117].
An excellent classification of the malicious nodes mecha-
nisms can be found in [118] in themore general context of IoT
communications (not focusing on the positioning part). The
types of malicious nodes attacks relevant to IoT positioning
can be summarized as follows:
• Conflicting behavior attack. The untrustworthy node can
transmit partially trustful information (e.g., correct IP
address) and partially incorrect information (e.g., faking
its position).
• On-off attack. A malicious node can transmit erroneous
positioning-related information only from time to time,
e.g., at random intervals.
• Sybil attack. This refers to malicious nodes using two or
more IP addresses so that their identification is hindered
by the random change in identity.
• Newcomer attack. A node previously identified as mali-
cious can change its IP and enter the network again as a
new node.
The authors in [119] proposed an algorithm based on linear
regression for the identification of the mobile fake or mali-
cious nodes, which requires a certain observation time inter-
val and knowledge about a certain percentage of trustworthy
nodes.
D. DATA PERTURBATION AND OTHER
OBFUSCATION METHODS
In order to preserve the privacy of the IoT device location
or of the access node location, different forms of position
information obfuscation methods have been proposed in
the literature. The classical methods of obfuscation simply
replace the true position information with a fake position
information when transmitting this information between the
actors in Fig. 1. An alternative way is the data perturbation
method, when the true location is embedded in noise and
only the noisy location estimates are transmitted. Various
types of noise and noise distributions have been used in the
literature: e.g., additive or multiplicative noises, correlated
or uncorrelated with the location information, and drawn
from various distributions. The most used distribution is the
multivariate Gaussian; this case is referred to as the simple
additive noise perturbation.
A third approach, presented in [120] for vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) communications combines the obfuscation
and power variability in order to form fake point clusters
and to decrease the probability that an attacker gets hold
inadvertently of the position of the IoT device.
More advanced mechanisms for the location privacy
protection have been also presented in [121] (relying
on Hidden Markov chains) and in [122] (semantic space
translation).
E. INTERFERENCE MITIGATION IN
NON-GNSS POSITIONING
1) MEASURES AGAINST SPOOFING
IN NON-GNSS LOCATION
Spoofing refers to situations when an attacker sends fake
position-related information to the IoT devices. This problem
is closely related to the problem of fake or malicious nodes
and has been addressed in Section III-C.
2) MEASURES AGAINST JAMMING
IN NON-GNSS LOCATION
Jamming refers to the narrowband interference of the wireless
signals on which the non-GNSS positioning is based, such as
narrowband interference in ISM bands (for WLAN and BLE-
based positioning) or in the cellular bands (for cellular-based
positioning). Examples of mechanisms to deal with jamming
attacks in wireless networks are found in [123] and [124].
3) MEASURES AGAINST MEACONING
IN NON-GNSS LOCATION
Meaconing refers to the situation when an attacker captures
a positioning-related signal and re-transmits it with a delay.
This terminology is very seldom used in the context of Non-
GNSS positioning, as its impact on the positioning accuracy
is not so high as in the GNSS case. For example, for a
WLAN-based or BLE-based positioning system, transmit-
ting the RSS with a delay would basically have little or
no impact on the training database used in positioning. For
cellular-based positioning, due to the authentication mecha-
nisms is also almost impossible to meacon the positioning
signals. Thus, we can state that meaconing is not a threat in
Non-GNSS positioning.
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES FOR SECURE AND
PRIVACY-PRESERVING POSITIONING IN IoT
This section surveys cryptographic techniques that can be
used for protecting location information and secure localiza-
tion in IoT. Although work designed specifically for secure
IoT localization is still mostly missing, we can utilize existing
schemes originally designed for applications that are closely
related or included in the IoT framework, such as (military)
WSN or RFID. The IoT inherits many of the threats of the
previous applications but, e.g., the heterogeneity of devices
that are connected into the same worldwide network and
the sensitive nature of location information (e.g., persons’
movements) handled in applications also set new challenges.
In Section IV-A, we first review standard cryptographic
solutions that can be used for securing communication of
location information over a public network. Section IV-B
reviews cryptographic distance-bounding protocols and
secure localization which have been previously used pri-
marily in WSN and RFID applications, but can be used
more generally for IoT. The IoT sets strict constraints for
cryptographic implementations and these are discussed in
Section IV-C. Because IoT handles a lot of users’ sensitive
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location information, localization in IoT also connects to
privacy-preserving techniques and Section IV-D discusses
certain aspects of privacy-preserving LBSs.
A. STANDARD CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR
LOCATION INFORMATION
Assume that a device (e.g., a beacon node or a user’s personal
device) knows its location (e.g., has a GNSS chip), which it
and the network trust to be correct up to necessary precision,
and the device wants to share this information with some
other devices (e.g., regular nodes or cloud service provider)
over the network (i.e., the Internet) in a secure manner.
In this case, location information can be treated similarly as
any other critical piece of information and standard cryp-
tographic techniques can be used for securing communica-
tion [125]. The other devices can trust the correctness of the
location information only if they can verify its authenticity
and integrity. The former means that the location information
was truly sent by the device claimed to be the source and
not by a malicious party claiming to be the correct source
(spoofing). The latter means that the information has not
changed on the way. The former implies the latter, but not
vice versa. The authenticity and integrity of location infor-
mation can be ensured with standard cryptographic tech-
niques. Computing a check sum by using a (cryptographic)
hash function (e.g., SHA-256 [126]) gives integrity, but with-
out additional techniques only against transmission errors
(i.e., no security). If the parties have a shared secret key,
they can use cryptographic message authentication to ensure
both integrity and authenticity (see, e.g., HMAC [127]).
Digital signature schemes based on public-key cryptogra-
phy (e.g., (EC)DSA [128]) allow verification of authenticity
and integrity without shared secrets. Additionally, digital
signatures provide non-repudiation, which prevents a sender
from later challenging sending the message. This can be an
important feature also in the context of location information
because it ensures that a device that has claimed to be at a
specific location cannot later refuse this claim.
The above schemes provide only authenticity and integrity
of location but the location information itself is, by default,
transferred as plaint text and is available to anyone observ-
ing traffic in the network. The simplest form of privacy of
location information (i.e., privacy in respect to third par-
ties) can be achieved by ensuring confidentiality of location
information transferred in the network. Confidentiality can be
achieved by encrypting the location information, again, with
standard cryptographic techniques. Encryption can be per-
formed either with secret-key cryptosystems, which require
that the communicating parties have securely shared a secret
key, or with public-key cryptosystems, where the key used
for encrypting is public (anyone can encrypt) but decryption
is possible only with the secret key of the receiver. Typically,
a combination of these is used so that the parties exchange
a secret key using public-key cryptography (e.g., with Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol [129]) and the actual encryp-
tion is performed with significantly more efficient secret-key
TABLE 7. Summary of standard cryptography for location information.
cryptography (e.g., with AES [130]) by using this key. Public-
key cryptography provides a solution for key distribution but
often requires a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) to ensure that
public keys belong to certain entities. Combination of con-
fidentiality, authenticity and integrity can be achieved with
authenticated encryption which can be achieved by authen-
ticating (with the above schemes) the encrypted location
information or directly by using a cryptographic mode for
authenticated encryption (e.g., AES-GCM [131]). However,
even plain encryptionmay give some guarantees of authentic-
ity and integrity because it can be difficult to forge a cipher-
text that decrypts into a meaningful location. Table 7 gives
a summary of cryptographic schemes and their properties.
Support for cryptographic techniques is included in popular
protocol suites such as IPSec, TLS/SSL (e.g,. OpenSSL),
and SSH.
B. DISTANCE-BOUNDING AND SECURE LOCALIZATION
The situation gets more difficult when a device does not know
its location or the location that it provides cannot be trusted by
the network (i.e., the device itself may try to cheat its location,
e.g., because it may be compromised or is not to be trusted in
the first place). This kind of challenges can be expected to be
common in the future IoT where devices that do not trust and
have no previous knowledge of each others should convince
each others about their locations. The cryptographic solutions
discussed in Section IV-A do not provide a solution in this
case, although they are still required to secure communication
between the devices. Some solutions to this problem have
been discussed already in Section III, but here we discuss a
specific solution called cryptographic distance-bounding and
its implications.
Cryptographic distance-bounding [132] was originally
introduced by Brands and Chaum in 1994. The protocol gives
an upper bound for the distance between devices based on
signal travel time that is bounded by c, the speed of light,
and cryptographic techniques that prevent specific types of
cheating. The protocol involves two nodes, a verifier V and a
prover P, and it consists of the following steps:
1) V selects k uniformly random bits: a ∈R {0, 1}k .
2) P selects k uniformly random bits: m ∈R {0, 1}k .
3) P commits to m by using a cryptographic commitment
scheme d = commit(m) and sends d to V .
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4) V and P repeat the following steps for i = 1, . . . , k:
a) V sends ai to P and starts a timer.
b) P receives ai, computes bi = ai ⊕ mi, and sends
bi immediately to V .
c) V receives bi and gets the time ti from the timer.
5) P sends the digital signature s = sign(a, b) and means
to open the commitment d to V .
6) V computes m′i = ai ⊕ bi for i = 1, . . . , k and verifies
that it matches with the commitment d (by opening d).
7) V verifies the signature s.
8) V accepts dmax = max(ti) c/2 as the distance between
V and P iff Steps 6 and 7 are successful.
Because bi depends on ai, P cannot transmit it before
receiving ai and the commitment of Steps 3 and 6 prevents
P from fabricating the value of m during or after the rapid
bit exchange (Step 4). Hence, the protocol prevents distance
frauds [132] where P, who is at distance d from V , claims to
be at distance d ′ such that d ′ < d (claiming d ′ > d is possible
by delaying responses in Step 4). The signature prevents a
malicious node M from impersonating P. Consequently, the
protocol prevents mafia frauds [133] (a type of relay attacks),
whereM between P and V aims to convince V that P is closer
than it is in reality.
The above protocol does not offer protection against all
types of attacks. For instance, it permits a terrorist fraud,
where a malicious P colludes with M to make V believe
it is closer without giving its secret key to M . The proto-
col is also vulnerable to distance hijacking [134], where a
malicious prover P takes advantage of an honest prover P′
who is closer to V . However, distance-bounding protocols
that are protected from (at least some of) these attacks are
available (see, e.g., [134]–[139]) and also reuse the basic
idea of rapid bit exchange combined with cryptographic tech-
niques such as commitments and signatures. Cryptographic
distance-bounding protocols are very sensitive to processing
delays because signals travel about 30 cm in one nanosecond.
Accurate bounds are obtained only if transceivers and com-
putation of the exclusive-or are very fast. Special hardware
solutions are needed in practice in order to obtain the required
nanosecond scale in processing delays. Surveys of distance-
bounding protocols are available in [136] and [140].
Secure localization gives means to a node to compute its
location in a robust way in presence of malicious nodes and
secure location verification allows verifying location claims
from other nodes [142].Many schemes are available in the lit-
erature (e.g., [137], [139], [141]–[144]) that are based on ver-
ifiable multilateration. Distance-bounding can be extended
to verifiable multilateration in two (three) dimensions with
cooperation of three (four) verifier nodes that know their
mutual locations [141]. The principle of verifiable multilater-
ation is shown in Fig. 3. Each verifier Vi obtains its maximum
distance di,max to P by running a distance-bounding protocol
placing P into the circle surrounding it. Together Vi can locate
P into the intersection of the circles (the gray area in Fig. 3).
The distance-bounding protocol allows P to increase any
FIGURE 3. Verifiable multilateration [141] where verifiers V1, V2 and V3
each run the distance-bounding protocol with a prover P and can securely
position P into the gray area when P is in the triangle formed by Vi .
di,max by simply delaying responses in rapid bit exchange
(Step 4). However, doing that makes the gray area larger and,
consequently, Vi will notice the cheating attempt. In order
to keep the gray area small and to successfully cheat its
position, P would need to decrease di,max to at least one Vi,
but this is prevented by the distance-bounding protocol. This
requirement holds only in the triangle (pyramid) formed by
Vi and, hence, secure localization and location verification
are not possible outside the triangle (pyramid).
The simplest attacks on the above scheme are generaliza-
tions of the attacks (the frauds) on distance-bounding dis-
cussed above. We already showed above that it is not possible
for a node to perform a generalization of the distance fraud
and report a false location. The scheme is also protected
from attacks where M impersonates either P or Vi because
the two-party distance-bounding protocols will fail and from
wormhole attacks where malicious nodes replicate signals
from Vi to other parts of the network. The above scheme is
vulnerable to more elaborated attacks where an attacker con-
trols several malicious P [141], a malicious P takes advantage
of an honest P′ (location hijacking) [134], or a malicious
P colludes with one or several compromised Vi. Protec-
tions against these attacks include using unclonable tamper-
proof devices [141] and using different distance-bounding
protocols [134]. Secure localization and location verification
can be used also for improving data security of IoT more
generally by introducing a location-aware security frame-
work [145]. Surveys of secure localization can be found,
e.g., from [146].
C. SECURE LIGHTWEIGHT CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR IoT
Although standard cryptography can be used for protecting
location information in IoT as discussed in Section IV-A,
implementation resources are commonly very limited for
IoT devices making cryptography difficult to implement
efficiently and securely. Lightweight cryptography refers
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to cryptographic algorithms and implementations that are
designed to offer security with small implementation require-
ments (small circuit footprint, low power consumption, low
memory requirements, etc.) [147]. These include both soft-
ware running on small microcontrollers as well as dedi-
cated integrated circuits. During the last decade or so, a
lot of research has been done in lightweight cryptogra-
phy. In secret-key cryptography, this includes introduction
of several lightweight stream ciphers (e.g., Trivium [148],
Grain [149], etc.) and block ciphers (e.g., PRESENT [150],
KTAN/KTANTAN [151], SIMON/SPECK [152], etc.)
together with lightweight implementations of various secret-
key primitives (e.g., [153]–[156]). In public-key cryptogra-
phy, the work has focused predominately on elliptic curve
cryptography [157], [158] and its lightweight implemen-
tations (e.g., [159]–[163]) because of its small key sizes
and relatively low computational complexity. The results of
research on lightweight cryptography can be used also for
improving secure (and privacy-preserving) localization in IoT
(and also for improving security of IoT more generally).
The main threats against well-designed cryptographic
algorithms (including the above ones) are related to weak
implementations and utilize information leakage through
unintentional channels called side-channels, which are
formed by different measurable characteristics of crypto-
graphic devices [164]. To prevent these leakages, crypto-
graphic algorithms must be implemented with special care so
that they include protections against implementation attacks.
Because devices in IoT are connected to the Internet, remote
attacks over the network are a threat and all cryptographic
implementations should have protections against them.
In particular, all cryptographic software and hardware
must be constant-time in order to protect against timing
attacks [165], which reveal secret keys from execution time
if it depends on the values of the secrets. Also attacks which
require physical access to a device performing cryptographic
computations (e.g., power analysis [166], electromagnetic
emanation analysis [167], fault attacks [168], etc.) can be a
threat. Obtaining secret keys from a device with a physical
attack allows acting as the device later on (i.e. performing
spoofing attacks). However, physical attacks are typically not
a threat to the confidentiality of the location simply because
having physical access already implies knowledge of the
location of a device. However, attacks during a temporary
access to a device may allow recovering its past or future
locations.
D. PRIVACY-PRESERVING LOCATION SERVICES
As discussed in Section IV-A, privacy against third parties
(i.e., confidentiality in respect to outsiders) is relatively easy
to achieve by encrypting the location information sent over
the network. Techniques such as virtual private networks or
Tor1 provide location privacy in respect to the network and
service provider by hiding the true origin of communication.
1The Onion Router, see www.torproject.org
However, they cannot provide full privacy in respect to the
first node(s) that are accessed in the network because the first
access node knows, e.g., that a user attaching to it via radio
link is within the range of the radio. In such cases, privacy
can be preserved by hiding all information that allows to
identify a user, e.g., by using pseudonyms. Such solutions
are used, e.g., in mobile communication systems, but their
secure implementation is difficult and tracking users may still
be possible in practice [169].
Privacy of the location information spans even further
because often privacy in respect to LBS (a legitimate party
of the communication) may be on the user’s wish list. These
services rely on the users’ location in a fundamental way
which prevents the user from obscuring his/her location and
continue using the service. Good examples are real-time
online map and route search services, location tracking of
vehicles for taxing, road tolling, or insurance purposes, etc.
This kind of LBSs have many advantages but have also raised
serious concerns because they enable very accurate profiling
for marketing purposes and, at least potentially, dystopian
surveillance states where citizens’ movements are tracked.
Often the user’s options are very limited: either share the
location or stop using the service. IoT is expected to collect
masses of data including data about our everyday movements
so the problems will only grow in the future. Hence, solving
the privacy issues regarding user location has significant
importance and there is a clear need for privacy-preserving
LBSs for IoT.
The topic of privacy-preserving LBSs spans far and has
connections to general privacy-preserving (cloud) compu-
tation. Traditional anonymization techniques have largely
failed to offer adequate levels of privacy (see, e.g., [170]).
Hence, more elaborated techniques are required to truly pro-
tect users’ privacy in the future IoT and cryptography plays
a significant role in ensuring sufficient protection. Homo-
morphic encryption that allows computations on encrypted
data offers a promise of privacy-preserving cloud computa-
tion [171]: A user can encrypt his/her data (e.g., location)
and the cloud service can perform computations on it in
the encrypted domain without learning the contents of the
data. Unfortunately, fully homomorphic encryption [172] that
allows arbitrary computations requires extensive computa-
tionmaking it impractical. Partially homomorphic encryption
(e.g., Paillier cryptosystem [173]), which allows computa-
tions with only some operations (e.g., additions), or leveled
homomorphic encryption [174], which allows arbitrary com-
putations up to a predetermined complexity, may provide
feasible solutions to some well-defined small problems.
Because there are no feasible general solutions for solving
the privacy problem of LBSs, the solutions available in the
literature are carefully designed for specific use cases; the fol-
lowing gives a few examples of solutions that rely on the use
of cryptography. A method for privacy-preserving secure
localization (see Section IV-B) was introduced in [175].
Solutions to privacy-preserving location tracking of vehicles
were given in [176], which introduced a privacy-preserving
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car toll system, and [177] which presented a privacy-
preserving driver’s insurance. Private proximity testing for
social networks, which allows persons to check if their con-
tacts are in proximity without learning or revealing the exact
locations, was presented in [178]. Because of the relatively
low number of existing solutions and the urgency of the
problem, designing techniques for privacy-preserving LBSs
can be expected to be an active research area in the near
future.
V. LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF LOCATION DATA PRIVACY
LBSs involve complex legal and policy issues. For instance,
spectrum requirements and standardization, as well as privacy
and data protection, must be addressed in the context of
technologies and applications for location estimation, navi-
gation and positioning. Currently existing infrastructures for
the provision of geolocation services are manifold, while IoT,
especially with 5G on the way, promises yet another layer
thereto. Indeed, the practical room for privacy is becoming
increasingly questionable as new areas of society become dig-
itized and connected. Location privacy is one of the biggest
concerns in relation to the use of mobile devices, and it
involves two distinct dimensions:
• Personal data protection relating to the use of location-
aware mobile devices, such as smartphones, and
• Vulnerabilities in localization related to GNSS technol-
ogy and radio communications systems involving the
use of jamming and spoofing devices.
These two issues require different legal treatment and instru-
ments, although inmost cases the first is given greater empha-
sis in considerations of location privacy in mobile devices.
Indeed, compared to the approaches to location data privacy
carried out under EU data protection laws, legal initiatives
concerning the prevention of GNSS jamming and spoofing
threats remain underdeveloped.
A. PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION RELATING TO THE
USE OF LOCATION-AWARE MOBILE DEVICES
There is a robust legal framework and an evolving body of
case law covering the area of privacy and personal data pro-
tection in Europe. First and foremost, the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights (ECHR, Art. 8) and the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights (CFR, Arts. 7, 8) safeguard privacy and
data protection, while EU secondary law, alongside national
laws, provides for more detailed regulation. For its part,
the newly adopted General Data Protection Regulation (EU)
2016/679 (GDPR) [179] is applicable from May 2018 while
the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) [180] applies in
the meantime. The e-Privacy Directive [181] (as amended
by 2009/136 EC) exists as a specific instrument regulating
data protection and privacy in the electronic communications
sector and is currently under reconstruction [182] alongside a
wider reform of the core legal frameworks of the Digital Sin-
gle Market. Cases are brought before national courts [183] as
well as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) [184]
and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) [183].
There are various types of location data associated with
geographic position, either implicitly or explicitly [185]. For
instance, the location of a smart device can be identified by
using different types of radio signals, such as, GNSS, GSM
and WLAN [186].
Article 4 (1) of the GDPR recognizes location data as
one of the ‘identifiers’ of personal data. This implies that
such data will always be considered personal, which was
previously somewhat unclear. Moreover, location data may
potentially be a special category of personal data, as it
can be associated with sensitive information (e.g. health-
related data), thereby requiring special protection under
Article 9 GDPR [186]. Location data can be collected
and processed lawfully under EU data protection law
(Art. 6 GDPR), for instance by securing the data subject’s
consent (Art. 7 GDPR) and by fulfilling privacy and human
rights requirements [186]. Specific requirements, including
for consenting, concern sensitive data (Art. 9 GDPR).
Article 32 of the GDPR requires data controllers or pro-
cessors to employ appropriate technical and organisational
measures to secure personal data (including location data)
while Article 25 mandates data protection by design and
by default. The principle of data protection by design and
by default should be ensured from the very beginning of
the development of LBS and navigation and position related
services. The recommendations of the Article 29 Working
Party are for LBS to be switched off by default and consent
being granular and limited in time [187]–[189].
B. PRIVACY RISKS IN AN IoT ENVIRONMENT
IoT presents a growing number of legal challenges, including
privacy and trust issues. In an IoT and ‘Big Data’ environ-
ment, it is common that different geolocation infrastructures
are combined. It is also common that data subjects disclose
personal location data about themselves, but disclosure can
also take place without the data subject’s knowledge [189].
Furthermore, the collection of location data from multiple
(sensor) devices creates unique identifiers which help IoT
stakeholders identify specific individuals [190]. In such an
environment, providers of LBS can gain a very comprehen-
sive overview of users’ habits and lifestyle (‘profiling’).2
Profiles, in turn, are apt to be used for decision-making
that significantly affects individuals, even in a discrimina-
tory manner. Risks imposed by the collection of location
data include data theft, burglary, and even physical aggres-
sion or stalking while unauthorised access to profiling data
may imply many types of conclusions to be drawn about a
person [191].
In general, the lawfulness of the processing of personal
(location) data on IoT is adherent to the general rules and
principles of EU data protection law. The importance of cer-
tain provisions is however highlighted in IoT context. The IoT
infrastructure needs to be properly secured in order to provide
legal certainty for data subjects. With regard to the obligation
2For a definition of profiling see art. 4 (4) of the GDPR
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to implement ‘‘appropriate technical and organisational mea-
sures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk’’,
such measures include pseudonymisation, encryption and a
process for regular testing (Art. 32 GDPR). However, devices
operating on IoT are often difficult to secure. Therefore, it is
important to comply with the data minimisation principle.3
For its part, Article 82(1) of the GDPR prescribes the right
to compensation for ‘‘any person who has suffered material
or non-material damage as a result of an infringement of this
Regulation’’. If security issues occur, product liability issues
can also be brought against IoT stakeholders, such as app
developers. The level of responsibility to the harm or damage
determines liability [192].
Furthermore, the Commission has adopted a recommenda-
tion for RFID applications [COM (2009) 3200 final] [193].
According to the recommendations put forward in the docu-
ment, Member States are to ensure that RFID applications
apply with data protection law and the e-Privacy Direc-
tive where personal data is concerned. The industry and
other stakeholders are to develop impact assessments for
RFID application implementation as well as certification or
self-assessment schemes for the existence of an appropri-
ate level of information security and privacy. Furthermore,
RFID applications should be transparent in their use of data
and accompanied by information, including whether personal
data is processed or location tracked [194].
The GDPR also explicitly includes provisions on profil-
ing whereas its predecessor regulated automated decision-
making. Not all ‘profiling’ falls under the scope of dedicated
regulation even if it would be processing of personal data
within the scope of the GDPR. According to Article 22, data
subjects have ‘‘the right not to be subject to a decision based
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which
produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly sig-
nificantly affects him or her.’’ Derogations include situations
where such decisions are based on authorizing law or the
data subject’s explicit consent or where they are necessary
for a contractual relation between the data subject and the
controller.
Data subjects must be provided with information about
personal data processed about them and the logic and means
and consequences of the profiling while the controller should
also ensure access to the personal data.4 This is also indi-
rectly required in the data quality principles in Article 5 of
the GDPR. Where personal data are processed for ‘‘taking
decisions regarding specific natural persons following any
systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relat-
ing to natural persons based on profiling’’ a data protection
impact assessment is required (Art. 35 GDPR).
In an IoT and Big Data environment consenting, pur-
pose limitation and data protection by design (esp. data
minimization) are however challenged. Indeed, massive
3See art. 5(1)(c) of the GDPR: Personal data shall be ‘‘adequate, relevant
and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they
are processed (‘data minimisation’)’’.
4Art. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and 15(1)(h), Recitals 60 and 63 of the GDPR
amounts of data is collected via (sensor) devices while
(beneficial) future uses might still be unknown. The legal
requirements must nonetheless be met. Thereby, purpose
specification, identity verification and authenticating access
requests become core issues to be tackled [195], [196].
C. VULNERABILITIES EXPOSED VIA JAMMING
AND SPOOFING DEVICES
GNSS technology can be affected by intentional and illegal
interference in GNSS signals through the use of GNSS jam-
mers and spoofers. The illegal use of jamming and spoofing
devices has exposed a serious threat to GPS/GNSS systems,
and criminal activities may also be occurring [197].
Protection of privacy is the foremost reason for using
certain civilian GPS/GNSS tracking jammers. For instance,
some GPS/GNSS tracking jammers are misleadingly adver-
tised as protecting the privacy of their users without affect-
ing navigation devices. Nevertheless, there is a threat of
illegal application when Personal or Privacy Protection
Devices (PPDs) are used [197]. In fact, it is illegal to market,
sell and use GNSS jammers in the EU, although it is not
illegal to own them [198].
The legal issues related to GNSS jammers and spoofers
are quite recent topics of discussion at the EU level, and the
related legal provisions are scattered among various pieces
of legislation. Jammers are mentioned in a document on the
interpretation of the Radio and Telecoms Terminal Equip-
ment Directive (R&TTE) (1999/5/EC) [199] so that theMem-
ber States are clearly against jammers being allowed among
the public. This is apparent from the discussions around the
R & TTE Directive as well as the Directive on Electromag-
netic Compatibility (EMC) (2004/108/EC) [200] and implies
the illegality of placing jammers on the market under either
one of the directives. The Member States’ authorities must
therefore withdraw jammers from the market and notify the
EU Commission [201]. Alongside, two very precise recom-
mendations concerning the prohibition on the sale and use of
jammers in CEPT member states are ECC Recommendation
(04) 01 [202] and ECC Recommendation (03) 04 [203].
The legal instruments relevant in addressing the legal
status of jamming and spoofing devises include Decision
No 1104/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 October 2011 on the rules for access to the
public regulated service provided by the global navigation
satellite system established under the Galileo programme
(PRS Access rules) [204], Decision No 676/2002/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002
on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in
the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) [205],
the Radio Equipment Directive (RED) 2014/53/EU [206]
(revising the R & TTE Directive 1999/5/EC), and Directive
2014/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of
the Member States relating to electromagnetic compatibility
(recast) [207] (replacing EMC Directives 2004/108/EC).
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VI. TECHNICAL AND LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRUSTED
LOCALIZATION SOLUTIONS IN IoT
This section summarizes the main design issues towards
achieving robust privacy-preserving and/or trusted localiza-
tion solutions in both GNSS and non-GNSS systems. First, in
order to mitigate the threats to GNSS signals and improve the
secure positioning in current IoT systems, the most suitable
techniques include:
1) Using the correction parameters broadcast through
the GNSS navigation message and through satellite-
based or ground-based augmentation systems such as
EGNOS to mitigate the system level or atmosphere
interferences.
2) Applying low complexity signal processing methods to
mitigate RFI and, especially, time-domain mitigation
methods, e.g. the pulse blanking, etc.
3) Implementing more robust code-phase based and
frequency-locked tracking loops to assist carrier-phase
based and phase-locked loops, providing aiding with
low-cost inertial sensors, and receiver integrity assess-
ment and fault-detection using RAIM algorithms.
For future IoT, assuming an improvement in device bat-
tery capability, cloud-based data processing and the evolu-
tion of integrated circuit systems, implementation of vector
tracking loops, tracking of modernized GNSS signals with
data-less components, and processing dual-frequency sig-
nals and multiple GNSS signals may be viable options to
eliminate system and ionospheric errors. In addition, more
complicated and effective signal processing methods, such
as techniques in transformed domains, adaptive methods,
etc., will be implemented in the side of sensor node of IoT
to mitigate RFI. Meanwhile, with the further development
of wireless communication and cloud computing, coopera-
tive localization and sensor integration in cloud servers will
be more promising to mitigate different levels of GNSS
threats to achieve security and robustness in IoT GNSS
positioning.
In non-GNSS technologies based on RSS, database quality
is crucial for the reliability of positioning. Statistical methods
for outlier detection should be used in order to detect errors
in the generated database. The threats related to malicious
nodes and spoofing can bemitigated by using statistical meth-
ods, e.g., linear regression and variance analysis to identify
and exclude these nodes. For privacy-preserving solutions,
downlink positioning beacons could be sent for all mobile
nodes in range, and trilateration methods could be employed
at themobile node based on the beacons received from several
access nodes in range. Also, a random MAC address, known
only by the authorized network, can increase the privacy of
the positioning . In network-centric positioning methods, the
client devices need to make sure that the network compo-
nents are trustworthy, which requires support for authentica-
tion methods. Privacy threats related to the device location
can also be mitigated using data perturbation or obfuscation
methods.
The robustness and security aspects in the positioning can
also be treated at the upper layer, independently of the type
of positioning algorithm: GNSS or non-GNSS. For exam-
ple, standard cryptographic techniques could be used for
improving the security and privacy of location information
in IoT. However, implementing cryptography for IoT devices
is challenging because the overhead on performance and
resource requirements must be kept to minimum as IoT
devices are often minuscule devices. Besides, the distributed
nature of IoT exposes the devices also to various types
of implementation attacks which further complicates imple-
menting secure cryptography for IoT. Fortunately, IoT can
benefit from the results of secure and efficient lightweight
cryptography. Techniques for robust and secure localization
and location verification are also available based on existing
work on WSN and RFID. The difficulty in adapting them
to IoT is the requirement for special hardware solutions
which are needed because cryptographic distance-bounding
is very sensitive to processing delays. IoT also sets other chal-
lenges because devices are heterogeneous and do not have
existing trust relationships with each others. Hence, adap-
tation of these techniques for IoT requires further research.
Privacy of users’ location information in LBS is an issue
of increasing importance as more and more of peoples’
sensitive location information gets recorded and stored into
LBS. This issue still largely lacks sufficient solutions and
can be expected to be an active topic of research in the near
future.
Last but not least, there are the legal aspects to be con-
sidered towards secure and privacy-preserving localization
solutions. In the issue related to privacy-preserving LBS in
IoT, some stakeholders believe that the recent EU data protec-
tion legal framework is efficient enough to tackle (location)
privacy concerns in relation to the application of IoT, while
others demand an advanced framework with more emphasis
on privacy and data protection [208]. However, perhaps both
sides are waiting for the application of the GDPR with high
expectations for location privacy in the IoT environment.
Despite legislative endeavours, technological development
brings about many risks to location estimation. IoT environ-
ments will need to safeguard location privacy and security in
order to be successful. The fundamental rights to privacy and
data protection bind the modern IoT to comply with human
right law requirements [209].
With regard to devices such as jammers and spoofers,
intentional interference with GNSS signals has added to the
legal challenges posed in the field of location and positioning
security. In order to safeguard effective and secure use of
GNSS services and to restrict the use and expansion of illegal
devices, coordination of laws should take place in the EU.
Laws need to be updated, harmonised and made clear for the
general public.
By analysing the relevant provisions of existing laws, their
suitability and limitations in the current situation should be
analyzed in a deeper manner and new developments should
be proposed to improve current policies and laws on the
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protection of privacy in localization and the prohibition of
devices that interfere with radio communications.
VII. CONCLUSION
IoT has gained significant attention over the last decade.
Thanks to the performance advances in small low-cost hard-
ware technology, smart sensors are becoming pervasive.
In IoT, various devices are exchanging information with each
other without human interaction and computing the informa-
tion intelligently. Context-awareness is a significant property
of IoT and location information and LBS play important roles
in such systems. Unfortunately, security and privacy aspects
have often not received the attention that they deserve in
designing IoT devices and systems, which has led to broad
security problems, which also affect secure localization, loca-
tion information, and LBS of IoT.
In this survey paper, we reviewed solutions to these prob-
lems. We first analyzed the threats and solutions to the GNSS
and non-GNSS based solutions for localization. We then
described certain cryptographic solutions for security and
privacy of location information, localization and LBSs in
IoT. Furthermore, we discussed the state-of-the-art of policy
regulations regarding security of positioning solutions and
legal instruments to location data privacy. We also reviewed
our concerns and gave recommendations for developingmore
secure and privacy-preserving localization and LBSs for
the future IoT. Our survey shows that many solutions are
available for improving robustness, security and privacy of
LBSs in IoT. Often they come with significant overheads
and require specialized expertise to be implemented correctly
which, arguably, are reasons why they are not included at
the moment. Nevertheless, certain open problems also exist,
in particular, in topics such as adapting existing solutions to
the IoT framework of interconnected heterogeneous devices,
secure localization in presence of powerful malicious adver-
saries, and privacy-preserving LBSs.We hope that this survey
paper will help in focusing future research for more robust,
secure, and privacy-preserving LBSs for IoT.
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